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ROUFAIL, MARY MICHEL, Ph.D. Evaluative Feedback and the Need 
for Cognition. (1992) Directed by Dr. John J. Seta. 60 pp. 
Research in social psychology has shown that individuals 
differ in the way they process information. For example, a 
central processing approach, consisting of an analytic con­
sideration of relevant arguments, characterizes people high 
in need for cognition. Individuals low in need for cogni­
tion, on the other hand, tend to be swayed by the peripheral 
aspects of a communication. The need for cognition is broadly 
defined as a motivation to engage in cognitively challenging 
activities. The present study was conducted to assess the 
effect of evaluative feedback on people's need for cognition, 
as measured by the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS), and by 
the subjects' performance on a cognitive task. We found that, 
compared to people low in need for cognition, individuals who 
reported a high need for cognition were less affected by 
feedback and generated a higher number of arguments for and 
against an issue. We discussed the practical as well as the 
theoretical implications of these findings. 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Social psychology has traditionally been concerned with 
the complex cognitive activities associated with our need for 
consistency (Festinger, 1957; Paulhus, 1982), for systemat­
ically assigning causes for observed events (Heider, 1958? 
Holtzworth-Munroe & Jacobson, 1985; Kelley, 1973), and for 
comparing ourselves to others for the purpose of evaluating 
our opinions and abilities (Festinger, 1954; Miller & McFar-
land, 1987; Seta, Seta, & Donalson, 1991; Wood, 1989). 
Another line of research has given much attention to the 
cognitive deficits which seem to characterize our thinking 
process (e.g., Langer, 1978; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Partic­
ularly in the area of persuasion, Cialdini and his colleagues 
(1975) suggested that much of the compliance phenomenon can 
be understood in terms of a preference for heuristics, rules 
of thumb designed to simplify or speed up our judgment. At a 
time when we are assaulted by an ever-increasing number of 
persuaders yielding an ever-increasing number of messages, 
many of which are of little importance, the shortcuts 
afforded by automatic responses are invaluable. However, 
in cases where the message may be crucial to our well-being, 
researchers have found that high involvement in an issue 
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will generally elicit an analytical rather than a mindless 
response (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Still, 
even when holding environmental events constant, individuals 
nevertheless differ significantly in the way they process 
information. They may either weigh the relevant factors of a 
communication, or attend to the peripheral aspects of a 
message. These differences are considered to be due to 
variations in need for cognition, a person construct. 
Although the usefulness of personality characteristics 
in predicting behavior has long been and still remains a 
subject of debate (e.g., Mischel, 1968), impressive consis­
tencies have been found in the domain of cognitive style. 
For example, Mischel's (1973) person variables include cog­
nitive and behavioral competencies, which he defines as a 
potential to construct and generate patterns of organized 
behavior. Witkin and his colleagues (Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, 
Goodenough, & Karp, 1979) distinguished between the cognitive 
style of field-dependent individuals, characterized by a 
tendency to perceive a stimulus as a global entity, and that 
of field-independent persons, who are sensitive to both the 
complexities and the differentiation of stimuli. Levelers 
and sharpeners fall along the same lines, respectively 
(Klein, 1970). Kagen (1972) also stressed the importance of 
examining individual differences in cognition. He suggested 
that people exhibit either a propensity toward or an avoid­
ance of complex cognitive activity. 
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The way we process information should obviously be taken 
into consideration in most, if not all, social interactions. 
The purpose of the present study was primarily to further 
investigate the notion of a need for cognition, one that has 
been defined somewhat differently by various researchers. 
In the mid-fifties, Cohen and his colleagues (Cohen, Stot-
land, & Wolfe, 1955) demonstrated that a differential need 
for cognition influenced people's affective and behavioral 
responses. Their experimental stimuli consisted of either a 
structured or an ambiguous form of the same story concerning 
a student's interview with a potential employer. Unlike the 
structured story, events in the ambiguous version were some­
what incoherent, no rationale was given for the behavior 
described, and the outcome was inconclusive. Compared to 
those low in need for cognition (LNC), the subjects high in 
need for cognition (HNC) reacted negatively to the obvious 
flaws in the narrative. Furthermore, a high need for cogni­
tion did not correspond to a need for achievement, leading 
the researchers to conclude that they had demonstrated sup­
port for "the notion of a need for cognition as a need in its 
own right" (p. 294) . Cohen and his colleagues defined the 
need for cognition as a "need to structure relevant situa­
tions in meaningful, integrated ways" (p. 291). They 
assessed it with the Situations Checklist and the Hierarchy 
of Needs Measure, neither of which is available any longer. 
4 
The Situations Checklist was described as a group of forced 
choice reactions to a number of hypothetical situations, 
where they had identified the high need response a priori. 
Cohen's view of the need for cognition stressed the motiva­
tional aspects of that need, assuming that a state of tension 
would lead to negative affect and to active efforts to remedy 
a situation where the need for cognition was unfulfilled. 
Cohen (1957) also found that HNC individuals were intrin­
sically motivated to elaborate on information regarding an 
issue, independently of a need-arousing communication. This 
was not true of LNC subjects. Participants read a message 
advocating grading on a curve before or after being told 
that their own university had worrisome grading problems. 
Results showed that the LNC subjects changed their attitudes 
in favor of the message, but only when it was preceded by the 
fear arousing communication. The order of presentation had 
no effect on the HNC students' attitude change. They 
obviously attended to the substance of the message, regard­
less of personal involvement. 
Similarly, a focus on the drive reduction properties of 
the need for cognition led Rosen (1964) to define this con­
struct as a relatively enduring disposition whose function is 
to reduce tension. Hence, he predicted that it would be 
aroused in some situations and not in others. Rosen and his 
colleagues (Rosen, Siegelman, & Teeter, 1964) .found that 
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individuals who showed a desire to be cognitively challenged 
preferred information unknown to most other people as opposed 
to widely known information. Rosen (1964) developed an 
instrument consisting of 293 true-false items resulting in 
12 scales. He administered his questionnaire to a High cog­
nitive group which comprised college students in an Honors 
program, a Low group from a minimally competitive college, 
and a Middle group consisting of liberal arts and science 
students. In general the differences between the Low and 
Middle groups were slim but the High cognition group differed 
significantly from the other two. Rosen found the Highs to 
be more intellectually motivated than the others but found 
no substantial differences among the groups on orientation 
to academic subject matter, emphasis on prestige, defensive 
denial, or independent self-confident intellectualism. More­
over, the 12 factors identified by factor analysis led Rosen 
to conclude that his scale described a number of needs which 
may not all be found in the same individual. 
The latest view of the need for cognition discounted the 
tension reduction aspect of the need for cognition. Cacioppo 
and Petty (1982) emphasized that they used the term "need" 
in a statistical rather than in a biological sense. They 
suggested that there were stable individual differences in 
people's tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive 
activity, and concluded that the need for cognition was 
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probably aquired in the course of development, that it would 
be rather consistent but also affected by the demands of the 
situation. 
Cacioppo and Petty's review of the compliance literature 
had revealed that some of the contradictory experimental 
findings could be accounted for by the differential way that 
people attend to a message. Their (1986) Elaboration Likeli­
hood Model proposed one of two routes to persuasion: a 
central processing approach reflecting a particular attention 
to the relevant arguments and characteristic of HNC people, 
and a peripheral approach, considering for example some 
trivial aspect of the communication, primarily used by those 
low in need for cognition. While Cohen et al. (1955) concep­
tualized the need for cognition as "a need to experience an 
integrated and meaningful world" (p. 293), Petty and Cacioppo 
argued that one might fulfill this need either by careful 
investigation of the relevant aspects of the information or 
by relying on an expert source, as noted by Adams (1959). 
In the first eventuality but not in the latter, the individ­
ual would demonstrate a high need for cognition. 
To distinguish between individuals who differ in their 
need for cognition, Cacioppo and Petty (1982) used criteria 
of ambiguity, irrelevance and inconsistency in selecting the 
items for the Need For Cognition Scale (NCS), which yielded 
one dominant factor. Furthermore, they validated their 
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questionnaire by asking their subjects to perform a tedious 
either very simple or more complex circling numbers task. 
Participants did not generally enjoy either task but the HNC 
subjects tended to prefer the complex to the simple task and 
the opposite was true of the LNC subjects. In addition, the 
higher the subjects' need for cognition score, the less 
likely they were to derogate the experimenter. Finally, 
Cacioppo and Petty's measure was found to correlate with ACT 
scores (r=.39, p<.01) but not with the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) and to relate 
negatively to Troldahl and Powell's (1965) measure of 
dogmatism (r=-.27, £<.05). The Need for Cognition Scale 
(NCS) was found to idnetify 
one primary factor in a reliable manner, to discrim­
inate between groups known to differ by their occupa­
tions in need for cognition, to assess a construct 
related to but distinguishable from cognitive style, 
and to be unrelated to (and unbiased by) respondents' 
level of test anxiety. (1982, p. 124) 
In addition, Cacioppo and his colleagues (Cacioppo, Petty, 
& Morris, 1983) reported two studies which found a weak cor­
relation between the Shipley-Hartford verbal intelligence 
score (Shipley, 1940) and the need for cognition (r=.15 
and .21). Another study yielded a moderate correlation 
between these two measures (r=.32; Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & 
Rodriguez, 1986). To investigate the possibility that indi­
vidual differences in message processing, which they had 
attributed to need for cognition, could be attributed to 
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intelligence, Cacioppo et al. divided their subjects into 
high intelligence and low intelligence groups and gave them a 
recall test. A main effect for verbal intelligence indi­
cated that subjects with high-verbal intelligence scores 
recalled more message arguments than did those with low-
verbal scores. These results paralleled the results obtained 
with the need for cognition. However, a stepwise regression 
analysis demonstrated that verbal intelligence and need for 
cognition accounted for significant but distinct sources of 
variance with respect to message recall. Moreoever, all the 
significant effects of need for cognition on message process­
ing remained significant when differences in verbal intelli­
gence were controlled statistically. These findings suggest 
that intelligence is at least partially independent of need 
for cognition. 
In his critique of the need for cognition, Heesacher 
(1984) praised the empirical construction of the scale, its 
convergent and divergent validity, and its internal consis­
tency as shown by the scale high theta reliability, a max­
imized Cronbach's alpha coefficient (.91; Cacioppo, Petty, 
& Kao, 1984). He noted, however, that the test-retest reli­
ability of the NCS was provided only indirectly: People 
typed as high and low in need for cognition showed systematic 
differences in performance 8 weeks later. 
Various lines of research have tested the'need for 
cognition, lending support for both the validity of the 
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construct and its applicability. Investigations of the need 
for cognition have revealed that high and low in need for 
cognition individuals differ in the way they process, recall, 
and are influenced by communications. Cacioppo et al. (1983) 
found that HNC subjects recalled more message arguments and 
expended more effort thinking about an editorial than did 
LNC subjects. Furthermore, they reported thinking more about 
the weak than the strong arguments of the message. Addi­
tional data showed a significantly larger correlation for HNC 
than for LNC individuals between message evaluation and atti­
tude change. Cacioppo and Petty (1986) found the NCS to be 
positively but weakly related to field independence, nega­
tively related to close-mindedness, and unrelated to Sara-
son's (1972) measure of test anxiety. The need for cognition 
was also found to correlate negatively with receiver's appre­
hension, a predisposition to respond to tasks with anxiety 
(Burr & Pryor, 1988). Olson, Camp, and Fuller (1984) reported 
a significant correlation between scores on the NCS and eight 
measures of curiosity, a moderate relationship between 
achievement (ACT) scores and NCS and a small correlation 
between NCS and social desirability. Furthermore, individ­
uals who differ in their need for cognition also differ in 
their learning style (Srull, Lichenstein, & Rothbart, 1985). 
Other studies, which distinguished between people high 
and low in their need for cognition on the basis of their 
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scores on the NCS, found a correlation between lower NCS 
scores and greater anxiety about tests, grades, and perform­
ing in front of others, but not physical harm, college life, 
and same and opposite-sex friends (Cacioppo & Petty, 1984). 
Compared to LNC subjects, HNC subjects worked harder to get 
information, and were more confident about intellectual but 
not about other issues, such as money (Sidera, 1983). Those 
who differed in their need for cognition also differed in 
their choices of magazines and in their preferences for 
activities demanding high cognitive effort (Tolentino, Curry, 
& Leak, 1990). Additionally, Ahlering and McClure (1985) 
reported that more HNC than LNC individuals planned to watch 
the Reagan-Mondale and the Bush-Ferrari debates, and gen­
erated more thoughts about the consequences of electing a 
particular candidate. Cacioppo and his assistants (1986) 
also found that HNC subjects thought more about the elections, 
had more information about the candidates, and showed a 
stronger relationship between their attitudes and their 
voting behavior than did LNC subjects. 
Experimental manipulations further supported the rele­
vance of the need for cognition in understanding social 
behavior. In a brainstorming task, LNC but not HNC subjects 
generated fewer ideas in group conditions than individually, 
but this social loafing phenomenon was present for both HNC 
and LNC subjects when they were asked to perform a 
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noncognitive task (Petty, Cacioppo, & Kasmer, 1985). Fur­
thermore, HNC, compared to LNC subjects, demonstrated lower 
sensitivity to peripheral cues, such as the number of argu­
ments in a persuasive communication, and the presence of 
audience cues, such as applause (Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 
1987; Haughvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1986) . 
The practical value of the need for cognition has been 
demonstrated in a number of ways. Assessments of both problem 
solving ability and need for cognition indicated that, com­
pared to LNC, HNC people used more efficient ways of coping 
(Heppner, Reeder, & Larson, 1983). Martin (1985) also noted 
the usefulness of considering people's need for cognition in 
counseling and psychotherapy. Moreover, Cacioppo and Petty 
(1984) suggested that the NCS, in conjunction with such tests 
as college entrance examinations, could be invaluable as a 
diagnostic test of scholastic performance. 
Additionally, even though research has supported the 
notion of the need for cognition as an intrinsic motivation 
to engage in certain activities, the need for cognition has 
not been studied in the context of the literature on intrin­
sic motivation. The present study, therefore, investigated 
that concept from the perspective of both intrinsic motiva­
tion and persuasion research. More specifically, we attempted 
to understand the mediating effects of the need for cognition 
on people's responses to evaluative feedback. 
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Intrinsic motivation is the desire to engage in a behav­
ior for its own sake rather than a means to an end (Lepper, 
1980). Deci and Ryan's (1985) cognitive evaluation theory 
proposes that three types of events affect intrinsic motiva­
tion: informational, controlling, and amotivating events. 
Informational events such as positive feedback or freedom in 
the choice of activities enhance intrinsic motivation because 
they make us feel competent and self-determining, respectively. 
Tangible rewards such as money given for engaging in a task 
are generally viewed as controlling in the sense that they 
elicit a particular behavior. Thus, they undermine self-
determination and lead to a decrease in intrinsic motivation. 
Amotivating events are those which threaten an individual's 
sense of competence. Thus, the effects of negative feedback 
should also be a decrease in motivation. In support of the 
theory, positive verbal feedback enhanced motivation, while 
negative performance feedback was shown to decrease motiva­
tion to engage in cognitive tasks (e.g., Deci, 1971; Vallerand 
& Reid, 1988; Weiner & Mander, 1978). Moreover, self-
determination was found to be an important factor underlying 
intrinsic motivation (Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith, & 
Deci, 1978). Prior research has shown that an illusion of 
choice (allowing subjects to "choose" by letting them draw a 
slip from a jar) is sufficient to create a situation where 
people feel self-determining (e.g., Sansone, 1989). In the 
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present study, subjects were required to generate a number of 
arguments in favor of or/and against a campus issue. Fur­
thermore, subjects were told beforehand that they could 
refuse to participate, at any time during the experimental 
session, without incurring any penalty. Finally, the experi­
menter did not in any way suggest that the subjects may be 
evaluated on their performance. Thus, the controlling 
aspects of the feedback were kept at a minimum, and the sense 
of self-determination was maximized, as the subjects were free 
both to continue with the experimental procedure and to 
express their opinions on an issue. 
Whereas cognitive evaluation theory describes the fac­
tors which maintain and enhance intrinsic motivation, Ban-
dura's (1982) self-efficacy model explains how people may 
develop an interest in certain activities, provided they feel 
a sense of competence. However, it is sometimes difficult 
to predict how people will interpret events, especially 
evaluative information. Some researchers have argued that 
women tend to react negatively to feedback, including posi­
tive evaluations, presumably because they react to the 
controlling aspects of the evaluative process (Deci, 1975; 
Deci, Casio, & Krusell, 1975; Zinser, Young, & King, 1982). 
Other studies found that positive feedback enhances intrinsic 
motivation regardless of age (Anderson, Manoogian, & Reznick, 
1976; Dollinger & Thelen, 1978) and gender (e.g., Blanck, 
Reis, & Jackson, 1984; Vallerand S. Reid, 1988). 
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The impact of feedback on intrinsic interest may also 
depend on personality characteristics. For example, 
Harackiewiz, Sansone, and Manderlink (1985) reported that 
motivating factors such as a need for achievement (n ach) 
also affected the way people responded to evaluative feed­
back. They gave their subjects two of three kinds of infor­
mations. In the expectancy manipulation condition, subjects 
were provided with a prediction of a better than average 
performance, based on their past performance. Additionally, 
they were given either a normative standard, which was set 
low enough to ensure that it would provide subjects in the 
standard condition with positive competence information about 
their ongoing experimental task, or a normative feedback, 
which allowed them retrospective evaluation of their per­
formance on the experimental task. Thus, all three manip­
ulations yielded positive information. Harackiewicz and her 
colleagues found that subjects low in achievement motivation 
who began their task with high expectations because of a 
positive expectancy manipulation enjoyed their subsequent 
task, but only when they were given competence cues that 
provided them with a sense of efficacy while they were solv­
ing word puzzles. Evaluations given before or after comple­
tion of the task undermined their enjoyment. The researchers 
concluded that situations where people low in n ach feel 
evaluated and are given feedback about their performance only 
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after the task is completed should be extremely aversive. 
On the other hand, subjects high in achievement motivation, 
expecting to do better than average, believed that they had 
performed better and enjoyed the task better, relative to 
their pretest report of enjoyment of such tasks. Normative 
feedback, supplied after task engagement, did not affect enjoy­
ment of the task for achievement-oriented subjects. The 
finding that poeple who differ in achievement motivation are 
affected differentially by evaluative positive feedback has 
implications for a concept such as the need for cognition 
which is, like the need for achievement, both a motivating 
factor and a personality characteristic. Thus, we hypoth­
esized that need for cognition might mediate the effects of 
evaluative feedback, as was the case with achievement motiva­
tion . 
The present study investigated the stability of a ten­
dency to engage in a cognitively demanding activity and the 
effects of a situational variable such as evaluative feedback 
on the need for cognition. Inasmuch as measures of intrinsic 
motivation generally concern enjoyment of the task at hand, 
our present study incorporated a specific as well as the 
global, probably more stable, interest measure. Subjects in 
our experiment rated the extent to which they enjoyed both 
the cognitive activity in which they had just engaged and 
cognitive tasks in general, as reflected by their scores on 
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the NCS. We assumed that the post-task enjoyment ratings 
would indicate the subjects' momentary response to the task 
at hand, and we focused on both the second NCS score (NCS2) 
and the difference between the two NCS scores as measures of 
the effect of feedback on people's customary interest in 
cognitive activities. Prior research has shown that feed­
back may convey competence cues which affect intrinsic moti­
vation (e.g., Vallerand & Reid, 1988). Feedback actually 
communicates multiple messages, one of which is competency 
and another relaying the information that others have favor­
ably or unfavorably judged one's performance. 
However, HNC individuals may be less likely than LNC 
subjects to be affected by positive or negative evaluations. 
People who have a high need for cognition have been found to 
be relatively unconcerned about the judgments of others. 
They are also confident in their ability, having presumably 
experienced repeated success with cognitive tasks; therefore, 
competency information related to this area should be of 
little value. Thus we predicted that, on the NCS2 measure, 
reflecting the subjects's level of interest in cognitive 
activities that they reported at the experimental session, 
HNC subjects would remain relatively impervious to evaluative 
feedback (either positive or negative) and would not signif­
icantly alter their stated overall interest in cognitive 
tasks. This would not be the case for individuals low in 
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need for cognition. Their tendency to be influenced by 
external cues should make them sensitive to evaluative infor­
mation. Thus we expected to find a difference in their NCS2 
scores across positive and negative feedback conditions, 
positive feedback leading to an increase of their NCS2 scores 
and negative feedback to a decrease of those scores. Further­
more, an additional measure, representing the difference between 
NCS and NCS2 scores (change score), should yield a main 
effect for need for cognition, if as expected, HNC subjects 
change less across contexts than do LNC subjects. 
In addition, we employed two control groups. Subjects 
in the first no feedback control group followed the same 
procedure as that of both the positive and negative feedback 
conditions, but were not given feedback. In the second no 
feedback control group, subjects' initial task consisted of 
the NCS scale. Thus, unlike the first control group, they 
took the NCS scale again at the laboratory session before, 
not after, completing the experimental task. We included 
this additional control condition to measure subjects' NCS 
scores in the immediate context. This measure would not be 
influenced by any expectations subjects might have developed 
concerning their performance had they engaged in a cognitive 
task prior to responding to the NCS. Thus, the first control 
group tested primarily the effect of no feedback on the need 
for cognition whereas the second control group yielded data 
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pertinent to the test-retest reliability of the instrument. 
In both control conditions, both change and NCS2 scores in 
the HNC and the LNC conditions should remain virtually 
unchanged. 
The enjoyment ratings may show a similar pattern of 
results as the change scores. Because people with a high need 
for cognition generally enjoy challenging cognitive activ­
ities, we expected the HNC group to rate the experimental 
task higher than would the LNC group. In addition, if as we 
expected, the HNC subjects are relatively impervious to feed­
back, then their enjoyment ratings should also be unaffected 
by feedback. People low in need for cognition, however, 
were presumed to be more likely to be sensitive to feedback 
than those high in need for cognition. Therefore, we pre­
dicted that their enjoyment ratings would also be influenced 
by feedback—a positive evaluation should enhance and a 
negative evaluation should decrease their enjoyment of the 
task. 
In addition to the participants' self-reports of their 
need for cognition, we measured their performance, in terms of 
both the number and the quality of arguments generated for 
and/or against a given issue. We predicted that overall, 
HNC would generate better and more arguments than would LNC 
subjects. 
Finally, a manipulation check ascertained the credibil­
ity of the bogus feedback. We asked subjects in the feedback 
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conditions to report the score that they expected to get on a 
subsequent task. We predicted that people in the positive 
feedback conditions would have higher expectations than those 
in the negative feedback conditions. 
20 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Participants were 168 female students from Introduction 
classes in Psychology at The University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro who took part in our study, in partial fulfillment 
of their class requirement. 
Design 
The study was a 2 (high and low need for cognition) X 4 
(positive, negative, first no feedback control, second no 
feedback control) factorial design. The second control dif­
fered from the other groups in the order of the experimental 
procedure. Our dependent measures were (a) NCS2 scores, 
(b) change scores, (c) enjoyment ratings of the experimental 
task, and (d) number of arguments.1 
Stimulus Materials 
Subjects were given the short form of the Need for 
Cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo, Petty s. Kao, 1982) at the 
beginning of the semester, along with other personality 
tests, as part of the general screening program of the depart­
ment. They were tested in a large group (of approximately 
100 subjects). Materials used at the laboratory sessions, 
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which were conducted between 2 and 6 weeks later, consisted 
of four packets, each one of which included instructions to 
the subjects, the descriptions of the experimental tasks, the 
NCS, and between one and three posttask questions. 
Procedure 
We used a median split to divide the subjects in low 
and high need for cognition groups. We then recruited them 
for a laboratory session and randomly assigned them to one 
of four feedback groups,with the restriction that subjects 
were assigned to each of the feedback conditions before 
the n+lth subject was assigned to a condition. Subjects were 
run either one at a time or in small groups of two to four 
2 
people. All subjects were given four packets, one packet 
at a time. The first one was the same for every subject in 
the positive, negative, and no feedback first control condi­
tions. The second control group followed a different order 
which will be described later. 
At the start of the session, the experimenter handed the 
subjects a packet consisting of three pages. On page 1, 
instructions to the subjects emphasized the confidentiality 
of the experimental situation, reminded the participants 
that there were no right or wrong answers to the tasks that 
they would be required to perform, but insisted on the need 
to attend to the task to the best of their ability (see 
Appendix A). On page 2, subjects read a cover story about 
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the purpose of the experiment which was reported to assess 
the attitudes of the student population at UNCG concerning a 
number of campus issues raised in colleges and universities 
across the country (see Appendix B). Description of the 
experimental task followed. The task consisted of generating 
as many arguments in favor of and/or aginst two campus issues, 
whose order was counterbalanced. Thus, each subject was free 
to choose whether to argue for, against, or for and against 
a topic. One issue concerned the desirability of allowing 
freshmen to keep a car on campus 5 years hence, the other 
had to do with raising college tuition, along the same time­
table. The 5-year lag was chosen to minimize personal involve­
ment (subjects would have presumably graduated by then). 
Subjects had 5 minutes to complete the task"^ at which time 
the experimenter told them that she would have to leave the 
room for a few minutes to seek the help of a fellow graduate 
student. Subjects were instructed not to communicate with 
one another during this time. When she returned, having 
ostensibly scored the essays, she handed the subjects the 
second packet. For people in the positive or negative feed­
back conditions, page 1 of the second packet consisted of: 
(a) the bogus feedback information about their perform­
ance on the task. In the positive feedback condi­
tion, subjects were told that departmental guidelines 
stated that experiments should be informational for 
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the participants as well as for the experimenter; 
therefore, we would share with them the additional 
information yielded by their responses on the pre­
ceding task. We informed them that their perform­
ance had been rated in terms of ease of task, number 
of arguments generated, quality of their arguments, 
and originality. They were advised that their 
score (90) indicated that they had done better than 
90% of the students who had performed a similar task. 
In the negative feedback condition, the percentile 
score was 10, and the subjects were informed that 
that score indicated that they had done better than 
10% of the students who had engaged in a similar 
task. 
(b) a rating scale, ranging between 0 and 100, of the 
extent to which they had enjoyed the task. 
(c) a question about the score that they expected to get 
on a subsequent task. This was a manipulation check 
(see Appendix C). 
Subjects in the first no feedback control condition 
received the same materials with the exception that they were 
not given any feedback about their task performance and were 
not asked about their expectations (see Appendix D). On 
page 2, subjects were asked to complete the NCS, described as 
an instrument designed to assess which tasks were of particular 
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interest to participants in psychological experiments at 
UNCG (see Appendix E). When our subjects first took the NSC 
during screening, the cover story was omitted. This cover 
story was designed both to minimize any self-presentation 
concerns that our subjects may have had and to provide a 
rationale for requiring them to complete the scale again. 
On page 3, they rated on a scale of 0 (for "not at all") to 
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100 (for "very much") how enjoyable the preceding task was. 
Subjects were allowed 5 minutes before the experimenter col­
lected the second packet and handed the third one. The same 
procedure was followed as with the first experimental task. 
The last packet consisted of a performance evaluation 
(for people in the feedback conditions only), and of an enjoy­
ment rating scale for the preceding task. Subjects in the 
feedback conditions were all given a highly favorable evalua­
tion, a percentile score of 95. This was done for the sole 
purpose of relieving any discomfort that subjects in the 
negative feedback conditions may have felt. Subjects were 
then debriefed, thanked for their participation, and urged 
not to discuss the experiment with anyone until the end of 
the semester. 
The second control group received all four packets, but 
in a different order. Subjects in this group took the NCS 
at the start of the laboratory session. Their first packet 
consisted of the instructions on page 1, followed by the 
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NCS on page 2. Thus, when the other subjects were completing 
the NCS, subjects in the second control group were performing 
the first experimental task. In sum, they followed the same 
procedure as the first control group, but in a different 
order. 
26 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A 2 (high, low need for cognition) X 4 (positive feed­
back, negative feedback, no feedback first control, no 
feedback second control) analysis of variance on a manipula­
tion check measure of expectations yielded a main effect for 
feedback. Subjects in the positive feedback conditions 
reported higher expectation scores (M = 79.15) about their 
performance on a subsequent task than did those given nega­
tive feedback (M = 51.82), F(l, 81) = 38.58, £<.0001. Our 
subjects were apparently convinced of the validity of the 
feedback that they received. 
An analysis of the means for the NCS scores for the high 
and the low need for cognition subjects, in each of the four 
feedback conditions at mass screening and later at the lab­
oratory session, indicated that for both control groups, the 
correlation between NCS and NCS2 scores was highly signifi­
cant (r = .77, N = 40, £<.0001 for the first control, and 
r = .76, N = 41, £<.0001 for the second control). 
To obtain the error term that we needed to test our 
various hypotheses, we performed a 2 (need for cognition) 
X 4 (positive, negative feedback, and 2 controls) analysis of 
covariance on the NCS2 scores, with the first NCS score as 
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the covariate. This analysis revealed a significant main 
effect for feedback, F(3, 159) = 3.02, £<.03. Need for 
cognition, F(l, 159) = 2.48, was significant at the .11 level 
(see Table 1 for the adjusted means of the NCS2 scores). We 
used the error term of this analysis to test our first exper­
imental hypothesis, which involved the effect of feedback 
(positive or negative) on NCS change scores. Specifically, 
we predicted that the need for cognition scores of HNC sub­
jects would be roughly equivalent across positive and nega­
tive conditions, whereas those of LNC subjects would be high 
in the positive and low in the negative feedback conditions. 
To test this hypothesis, we had to determine whether the 
difference in need for cognition NCS2 scores across the posi­
tive and negative feedback conditions was smaller for HNC 
than for LNC subjects. This comparison was significant, 
F(1, 159) = 4.30, £<.04 (see Figure 1), indicating that there 
was a greater difference across the positive and negative 
feedback conditions for low than for high in need for cogni­
tion subjects. In further support of this hypothesis, HNC 
subjects' NCS2 scores did not differ from either HNC control 
groups (F<1), supporting the prediction that people high in 
need for cognition would be relatively unaffected by feedback. 
However, LNC subjects who received positive feedback had 
significantly higher NCS2 scores than those of LNC subjects 
in the first control condition, F(l, 159) = 6.17, £<.01, and 
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in the second control condition, F(l, 159) = 3.69, p<.06. 
Further analyses revealed that LNC subjects who received nega­
tive feedback decreased their NCS scores significantly more 
than did the corresponding HNC subjects, F(l, 159) = 5.15, 
£<.02. 
To determine if LNC subjects were generally more influ­
enced by external cues than were HNC subjects, we performed 
a 2 (need for cognition) X 4 (feedback) analysis of variance 
on the change scores. This analysis yielded a main effect 
of need for cognition, F(l, 160) = 6.21, £<.01. This effect 
indicated that LNC subjects changed more (M = 9.52) across 
contexts than did HNC subjects (M = 4.65; see Table 2 for 
the means for the change scores). 
For the enjoyment ratings, we considered only the first 
control group, along with the positive feedback and the nega­
tive feedback conditions. This is because subjects in the 
first control group followed the same procedure as the sub­
jects in the feedback conditions, whereas subjects in the 
second control group started by answering the NCS scale, 
which may have biased their response to the cognitive task. 
We predicted that HNC subjects' enjoyment ratings would show 
no difference across feedback conditions, but that the LNC 
groups would report greater enjoyment of the experimental 
task in the positive condition than in the negative condi­
tion. Although, as can be seen from Table 3, the pattern was 
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as expected, the difference was not statistically signifi­
cant, F(l, 116) = 1.62, p<.20. The error term for this 
planned comparison was obtained from a 2 (high and low need 
for cognition) X 3 (positive, negative, no feedback control) 
analysis of variance, which yielded a main effect of feed­
back, F(2, 116) = 21.08, £<.0001. This effect indicated that 
people rated the rask as more enjoyable when they were given 
positive than negative feedback, and this was true of both 
HNC subjects, £(1, 155) = 11.68, £<.001, and LNC subjects, 
F(l, 155 = 28.59, £<.0001. 
Therefore, although NCS scores of HNC subjects were less 
influenced by feedback than those of LNC subjects, this 
difference was not significant for the enjoyment ratings. 
It appears that positive or negative feedback reduced the 
impact of personality differences for the enjoyment measure. 
Thus, enjoyment of a cognitive activity may be a function of 
such variables as audience praise, in addition to intrinsic 
interest. 
Finally, as expected, HNC individuals generated signif­
icantly more arguments (M = 6.01) than did LNC subjects, 
M = 5.16, F (1, 166) = 6.68, p<.01. In being consistent with 
the construct, this finding further validates the need for 
cognition scale. 
In sum, as predicted, NCS scores of HNC individuals 
did not change across feedback conditions. This was not 
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the case for LNC subjects, whose NCS scores were greatly 
affected by feedback. Moreover, compared to HNC subjects, 
LNC subjects were generally more influenced by external cues. 
The same pattern of results was found for the enjoyment 
ratings of the experimental task, although the differences 
among the scores were not statistically significant. Fur­
thermore, the difference between the actual performance of 
LNC and HNC subjects on the experimental task supports the 
validity of the need for cognition construct. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, people high in need for cognition were less 
influenced by either negative or positive feedback than 
those low in need for cognition. Investigations of the 
effects of rewards—including positive and negative feedback— 
on intrinsic motivation generally indicate that task contin­
gent rewards decrease interest in a previously valued activ­
ity. On the other hand, performance contingent feedback, 
which includes competence information, enhances intrinsic 
motivation (e.g., Pittman, Davey, Alafat, Wetherill, & Kramer, 
1980). Results vary, however, according to the salience of 
either the controlling or the informational aspects of the 
situation. Indeed, it has been suggested that we should 
consider the psychological meaning of the reward rather than 
the contingency (Ryan et al., 1983). The finding that, com­
pared to LNC subjects, HNC subjects were relatively unaffected 
by feedback, suggests that people who differ in their approach 
to processing a message are also likely to respond differently 
to information regarding their own performance. 
The results of our study also indicate that, given 
positive feedback, people low in need for cognition are likely 
to change their attitudes towards an entire category of 
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activities, which they had previously deemed uninteresting. A 
number of researchers have shown that, under certain circum­
stances, people low in need for cognition will alter their 
information-processing style. LNC subjects adopted the 
analytic approach typical of HNC individuals when the message 
was highly relevant (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), or when they 
were primed by a bogus personality assessment test (Petty & 
Brock,1979). However, the response, or lack thereof, of HNC 
subjects to feedback is certainly worth noting, at least for 
its practical implications. For example, people with a high 
need for cognition would constitute a highly desirable popula­
tion in any setting where evaluations are expected to be 
forthcoming. Being relatively unaffected by feedback infor­
mation, such individuals would retain their interest in a 
task, regardless of the nature of the evaluation. Accord­
ingly, they may also be more likely than people low in need 
for cognition to persist in the performance of their duties, 
even when receiving negative feedback. 
Finally, such results confirm the growing realization 
that we must continue to look for the person in the situation. 
Individuals high in need for cognition were shown to remain 
consistent across feedback conditions as well as across con­
texts. Moreover, as cited earlier, compared to those who 
report a low need for cognition, people who are high in need 
for cognition are not easily influenced by external cues and 
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tend to show great consistency between their attitudes and 
their behavior. Thus, at least in the case of high need for 
cognition individuals, a person variable may help predict 
behavior. 
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Footnotes 
*Two independent judges rated the quality of our sub­
jects' arguments. However, their scores were too discrepant 
to allow a meaningful analysis, so we omitted this dependent 
variable. 
2  . . .  
As the number of subjects participating at any time in 
the laboratory session depended solely on the subjects' time, 
it varied randomly and as such did not seem to correspond to 
any systematic change. 
3The time allowed for the task was based on discussions 
among people in our lab, who shared with us their experience 
with similar tasks. 
4Rating the NCS was a filler task, designed to alleviate 
any suspicions subjects may have had concerning the purpose of 
the experimental task ratings. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
Read the following materials very carefully! Please 
do not turn to the next page unless instructed to do so. 
Read the material in the order presented, and do not flip 
back to a previous page. Today we will ask you to engage in 
a number of activities. We would like you to perform them 
to the best of your ability. You will not be doing exactly 
the same thing as the other people in this room, so do not 
concern yourself with what they do. Just focus on your task. 
YOUR PERFORMANCE, AND ANY QUESTIONS THAT YOU MAY ANSWER, 
WILL REMAIN TOTALLY CONFIDENTIAL. As the experimental tasks 
will be varied, it is essential to refrain from talking at 
all times. 
If you have a question, please write it on the blank 
paper that is on your desk, raise your hand, and I will 
attend to it personally. You have been assigned an experi­
mental number, which is printed at the right corner of this 
paper. Be sure to write it on each page of the materials 
that you will fill out today. Your experimental number will 
help us to keep the various materials in order while allow­
ing us to discard your social security number, thereby 
preserving your anonymity. 
Please begin by filling out the following information: 
Session: Experimental number: 
Age: 
APPENDIX B 
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Experimental Task A 
The purpose of this task is to assess the attitudes of a 
sample of the student population at UNCG concerning a number 
of issues raised in colleges in universities across the 
nation. 
Each of you will perform slightly different activities, 
picked at random, so concentrate only on your particular 
task. 
Your task will be to list as many arguments as possible 
in favor and/or against an increase in college tuition, to 
be instituted 5 years from now. 
In other words, tell us why the Administration should 
and/or should not raise the tuition at UNCG, starting in 
1996. You are free to choose one or both sides of the issue. 
When I tell you to start, turn to the next page and list 
your arguments for and/or against a 1996 policy of raising 
the tuition at UNCG. You will have about 5 minutes to com­
plete your task. 
When I let you know that the 5 minutes are over, stop 
immediately, turn this packet over, and wait. 
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Experimental Task C 
The purpose of this task is to assess the attitudes of 
a sample of the student population at UNCG concerning a 
number of issues raised in colleges and universities across 
the nation. 
Each of you will perform slightly different activities, 
picked at random, so concentrate only on your particular 
task. 
Your task will be to list as many arguments as possible 
in favor and/or against the desirability of allowing freshmen 
to have a car on campus, effective 5 years from now. 
In other words, tell us why the Administration should 
and/or should not allow freshmen to have a car on campus, 
starting in 1996. You are free to choose one or both sides 
of the issue. 
When I tell you to start, turn to the next page and list 
your arguments for and/or against a 1996 policy of allowing 
freshmen to have a car on campus. You will have about 5 
minutes to complete your task. When I let you know that the 
5 minutes are over, stop immediately, turn this packet over, 
and wait. 
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Thank you for completing task A (or C). Departmental 
guidelines state that experiments should be informational 
for the participants as well as for the experimenter. There­
fore, we are sharing with you the additional information 
yielded by your responses on Task A(C). 
Your performance on Task A(C) has been scored according 
to: 
1. task ease (how difficult your task was). 
2. creativity (how original your suggestions were). 
3. quality (how good). 
4. quantity (how many arguments you generated). 
The following score is a percentile score. It means that your 
performance on Task A(C) was superior to that of % of 
the people who participated in a similar experiment. 
Score: 
1. On a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 = not at all, and 
100 = very much, please indicate the extent to which 
you have enjoyed Task A(C). 
I I I I I I I I I I I 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
2. Write down the score (between 0 and 100) that you expect 
to get on the next task: 
Please turn to the next page. 
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Thank you for completing Task A(or C). 
On a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 = not at all, and 
100 = very much, please indicate the extent to which you have 
enjoyed Task A(C)-
I I I I I I I I I I I 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Please turn to the next page. 
APPENDIX E 
NEED FOR COGNITION SCALE 
PLEASE NOTE 
Copyrighted materials in this document have 
not been filmed at the request of the author 
They are available for consultation, however 
in the author's university library. 
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Figure 1. Adjusted NCS2 scores as a function of need 
for cognition and feedback. 
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Table 1 
Least Square Means of NCS2 Scores as a Function of 
Need for Cognition and Feedback 
Feedback 
Need for cognition 
positive negative no 
1st control 
no 
2nd control 
High 23.68 
N = 22 
23.16 
N=21 
18.05 
N = 20 
22.58 
N=19 
Low 23.89 
N=21 
12.03 
N= 2 3 
13.99 
N=20 
16.53 
N= 22 
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Table 2 
Mean Change Scores as a Function of Need for 
Cognition and Feedback 
Feedback 
Need for cognition 
positive negative no 
1st control 
no 
2nd control 
High 7.18 4.71 0.80 5.68 
N = 22 N = 21 N=20 N=19 
Low 15.38 5.39 8.40 9.27 
N=21 N=23 N = 20 N = 22 
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Table 3 
Mean Enjoyment Ratings as a Function of Need 
for Cognition and Feedback 
Feedback 
Need for cognition positive negative no 
High 69.32 43.83 48.00 
N=22 N=18 N=20 
Low 73 .24 
N = 21 
34.52 
N= 21 
46.00 
N = 20 
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RAW DATA 
The SAS System 
SUBJ FBK NCS NCS2 
41 4 18 27 
42 4 -4 -14 
43 1 28 27 
44 1 9 17 
45 3 39 34 
46 2 -14 -9 
47 2 26 27 
48 3 8 1 
49 4 61 38 
50 4 8 22 
51 1 20 64 
52 1 -13 -5 
53 3 28 41 
54 2 -26 -39 
55 2 22 21 
56 3 -31 -39 
57 4 2B 32 
58 4 1 -1 
59 1 32 40 
60 1 8 39 
61 4 14 13 
62 2 8 7 
63 2 39 34 
64 3 -35 -23 
65 4 23 24 
66 4 1 22 
67 1 24 32 
68 1 -2 7 
69 3 26 40 
70 2 -13 -15 
71 2 31 51 
72 3 -26 6 
73 3 27 42 
74 4 -1 4 
75 1 26 39 
76 1 9 13 
77 3 19 32 
78 2 -28 -16 
79 2 21 37 
80 3 -33 15 
81 4 18 31 
82 4 3 25 
83 2 26 27 
84 1 5 9 
85 3 17 7 
86 2 4 12 
87 2 19 29 
88 3 -38 -9 
89 4 14 33 
90 4 -38 -4 
91 1 48 53 
92 1 8 27 
93 3 18 34 
94 2 -8 0 
95 2 33 51 
96 3 1 11 
The SAS System 
SUBJ FBK NCS NCS2 
:51 Monday, March 23, 1992 1 
CH ENJ NC 
9 80 hi 
-10 80 1o 
-1 60 M 
8 88 1o 
-5 70 hi 
5 30 1o 
1 20 hi 
-7 0 1o 
-23 80 hi 
14 90 1o 
44 95 hi 
8 70 1o 
13 10 hi 
-13 30 lo 
-1 50 hi 
-8 10 lo 
4 55 hi 
-2 40 lo 
8 52 hi 
31 80 lo 
-1 60 hi 
-1 1 o 
-5 10 hi 
12 40 lo 
1 80 hi 
21 70 lo 
8 70 hi 
9 80 lo 
14 65 hi 
-2 40 lo 
20 . hi 
32 100 lo 
15 70 hi 
5 95 10 
13 70 hi 
4 70 lo 
13 70 hi 
12 . lo 
16 . hi 
48 100 lo 
13 60 hi 
22 80 lo 
1 . hi 
4 85 lo 
-10 90 hi 
8 15 lo 
10 60 hi 
29 80 lo 
19 50 hi 
34 90 lo 
5 65 hi 
19 70 lo 
16 20 M 
8 25 lo 
18 100 hi 
10 30 lo 
:51 Monday, March 23, 1992 2 
CH ENJ NC 
97 4 17 24 7 60 hi 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
66 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
76 
79 
BO 
G1 
82  
83 
64 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
98 4 7 15 8 72 lo 
99 1 36 36 0 15 M 
100 1 -6 -1 5 80 lo 
101 3 32 23 -9 50 M 
102 2 -19 -40 -21 0 lo 
103 2 36 33 -3 30 hi 
104 3 -7 23 30 70 lo 
105 4 15 30 15 100 hi 
106 4 -15 11 26 100 lo 
107 1 38 52 14 100 M 
108 1 -26 -10 16 40 lo 
109 3 24 9 -15 10 hi 
110 2 2 27 25 30 lo 
111 2 36 39 3 20 hi 
112 3 -3 -16 -13 20 lo 
113 4 25 47 22 0 hi 
1 14 4 8 12 4 95 lo 
115 1 14 22 8 90 hi 
1 16 1 0 17 17 50 lo 
117 3 41 53 12 40 hi 
1 18 2 9 33 24 50 1 0 
1 19 2 63 68 5 50 hi 
120 3 2 5 3 60 1 0 
121 4 30 25 -5 50 hi 
122 4 12 12 0 80 1 0 
123 1 17 20 3 80 hi 
124 1 11 35 24 85 10 
125 3 16 19 3 10 hi 
126 2 3 2 -1 30 1 o 
127 2 53 44 -9 45 hi 
128 3 0 21 21 40 1 0 
129 4 38 63 25 90 hi 
130 4 -17 12 29 90 10 
131 1 14 12 -2 60 hi 
132 1 -2 22 24 40 1 0 
133 3 20 14 -6 40 hi 
134 3 3 6 3 80 1 0 
135 2 3B 54 16 10 hi 
136 3 8 0 -8 60 1 o 
137 4 21 35 14 80 hi 
138 4 -22 3 25 30 1 0 
139 1 IB 25 7 80 hi 
140 1 -4 19 23 100 lo 
141 3 25 22 -3 30 hi 
142 2 -14 -10 4 35 1 0 
143 2 21 34 13 50 hi 
144 3 5 14 9 30 )o 
145 4 39 34 -5 45 hi 
146 4 -8 1 9 55 lo 
147 1 22 34 12 50 hi 
148 1 3 12 9 70 lo 
149 3 31 27 -4 30 hi 
150 2 -21 4 25 50 1 0 
151 2 26 22 -4 20 hi 
152 3 -21 -19 2 0 lo 
Th« SAS Syttam 17:51 Monday, M»rc> 
SUBJ FBK NCS NCS2 CH ENJ NC 
153 4 23 20 -3 45 hi 
154 4 -19 -23 -4 70 lo 
155 1 19 36 19 88 M 
156 1 -8 1 9 60 lo 
157 3 39 4 -35 60 hi 
158 2 11 25 14 10 lo 
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119 159 2 25 22 -3 62 hi 
120 160 3 4 0 -4 0 to 
121 161 4 33 35 2 60 hi 
122 162 4 11 12 1 10 1 0 
123 163 1 24 16 -6 50 hi 
124 164 1 -3 3 6 70 lo 
125 165 3 25 29 4 0 hi 
126 166 2 -6 2 6 40 1o 
127 167 2 30 27 -3 60 hi 
126 166 2 -5 -13 -6 50 1 0 
129 169 4 25 25 0 50 hi 
130 170 4 5 9 4 50 1 0 
131 171 1 36 19 -19 45 hi 
132 172 1 12 26 14 70 lo 
133 173 3 21 34 13 70 hi 
134 174 2 4 9 5 40 1 0 
135 175 2 35 46 11 60 hi 
136 176 3 -15 -6 7 60 1 0 
137 177 4 30 35 5 60 hi 
136 176 4 7 -24 -31 30 lo 
139 179 1 23 6 -15 65 hi 
140 160 1 10 46 36 60 1 0 
141 161 3 44 52 6 70 hi 
142 163 2 43 44 1 52 hi 
143 164 3 5 -1 -6 30 1 0 
144 165 4 52 61 9 60 hi 
145 166 4 -6 22 30 30 1 0 
146 167 1 37 46 9 100 hi 
147 166 1 9 34 25 100 1 0 
146 169 3 36 27 -11 65 hi 
149 190 2 7 -9 -16 50 1 0 
150 191 2 47 36 -9 40 hi 
151 192 3 9 7 -2 70 1 0 
152 194 4 -5 2 7 60 1 0 
153 195 1 23 26 5 65 hi 
154 196 1 6 11 3 60 lo 
155 197 3 44 47 3 50 hi 
156 198 2 12 14 2 20 1 0 
157 199 2 13 34 21 30 hi 
156 200 3 -6 4 10 40 1 0 
159 201 1 24 42 IB 75 hi 
160 202 4 -6 3 1 1 40 1 0 
161 204 1 -11 IB 29 50 1 0 
162 206 2 -3 6 11 40 1 0 
163 207 1 30 64 34 100 hi 
164 210 2 0 9 9 30 1 0 
165 211 1 24 16 -6 50 hi 
166 212 2 -2 25 27 50 1 o 
167 214 4 12 13 1 90 1 0 
166 216 2 -19 -20 -1 60 1 0 
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- NC*h1 FBKel 
varlabia N Maan Std Dav Minimum Maximum 
— — — — • — -  ———• — — — 
SUBJ 22 132 5454545 53. 5232260 43, .0000000 211, .0000000 
NCS 22 26. ,3161616 6. 7669169 14, .0000000 48 .0000000 
NCS2 22 33. 5000000 15, .69BB019 6. 0000000 64, .0000000 
CH 22 7. 1616162 14, 1341746 -19. 0000000 44, .0000000 
ENJ 22 69. 3161616 21 . 5061151 15. 0000000 100, .0000000 
NC«h1.FBK=2 
59 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SUBJ 21 121 .0952381 46, .94B8070 47 .0000000 1B9 .0000000 
NCS 21 32 .523B095 12, .0483154 13 .0000000 63 .0000000 
NCS2 21 37 .2360952 12, .1198361 21 .0000000 66 .0000000 
CH 21 4 .7142857 9. 6651066 -9 .0000000 21 .0000000 
ENJ IB 43 .8333333 24.1179699 10 .0000000 100 .0000000 
NC«h1 FBK=3 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SUBJ 20 121 , .6000000 46. 5963962 45, .0000000 197, .0000000 
NCS 20 26, .7000000 9. 2798593 16. 0000000 44. 0000000 
NCS2 20 29, .5000000 14. ,2699537 4, .0000000 53. 0000000 
CH 20 0. 8000000 13. 0811234 -35. 0000000 16. 0000000 
ENJ 20 48. 0000000 28. 1630590 0 90. 0000000 
NC=h1 FBK=4 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SUBJ 19 112, .3664211 45. 6900312 41 , .0000000 185, .0000000 
NCS 19 27, .5789474 12, 7249352 14, .0000000 61 , .0000000 
NCS2 19 33, .2631579 12. 5292640 13, .0000000 63. 0000000 
CH 19 5, .6B42105 1 1 . 2844664 -23, .0000000 25, .0000000 
ENJ 19 62. 3684211 22. ,0711237 0 100. 0000000 
The SAS System 17:51 Monday, March 23, 1992 5 
- NC=1o FBK=1 
Varlable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SUBJ 21 124. 0000000 49, .6366946 44, .0000000 204, .0000000 
NCS 21 0. 8095238 9. 7960147 -26, .0000000 12, .0000000 
NCS2 21 16. 1904762 14, .7736B96 -10, .0000000 46. 0000000 
CH 21 15. 3809524 10. 0273436 3. 0000000 36. 0000000 
ENJ 21 73. 2380952 16. 6640474 40. 0000000 100. 0000000 
NC=10 FBK=2 
Variable N Mean Std Dev M1nlmum Maximum 
SUBJ 23 136. 3478261 55. 5686379 46, .0000000 216, .0000000 
NCS 23 -5, .1304348 12. 0992274 -28, .0000000 12, .0000000 
NCS2 23 0. ,2608696 19. 2335346 -40, .0000000 33. 0000000 
CH 23 5. ,3913043 12. 8407701 -21 , .0000000 27. 0000000 
ENJ 21 34. 5238095 15. 07520B3 0 60. 0000000 
NC=1o FBK=3 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SUBJ 20 122 .3000000 46. 2636609 48.0000000 200 .0000000 
NCS 20 -8 .5000000 16. 2205198 -38.0000000 9 .0000000 
NCS2 20 -0 .1000000 15. 3687996 -39.0000000 23 .0000000 
CH 20 8 .4000000 16. 2169502 -13.0000000 48 .0000000 
ENJ 20 46 .0000000 31. 6892809 0 100 .0000000 
NC«l0 FBK«4 
Variable N Maan Std Dav Minimum Max 1mum 
SUBJ 22 126. 1818182 52, .2627395 42, .0000000 214. 0000000 
NCS 22 -3. 1818182 12. 8827547 -38. 0000000 12. 0000000 
NCS2 22 6. 0909091 13. 4338205 -24, .0000000 25. 0000000 
CH 22 9. 2727273 15. 2477378 -31 , .0000000 34. 0000000 
ENJ 22 65. 7727273 26. 3545999 10. 0000000 100. 0000000 
